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Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the
Darwinian Common Law Paradigm
Allen Mendenhall
1 Among the operative paradigms for the common law within the American constitutional
framework,  two take  prominence:  one  that  treats  the  common law as  a  settled  and
complete canon of rules unchanged over time, and the other that treats the common law
as  a  process  for  deciphering  malleable  and  adaptive  rules.1 The  former  is  evoked
whenever a judge or justice declares, “At common law, the rule was such and such,”2 as if
the rule had never been anything else and was not still within the common law tradition,
albeit  in  attenuated  form  and  subject  to  constitutional  restrictions.  Although  these
paradigms of the common law track similar, related debates about whether the United
States  Constitution should be interpreted as  a  “living” document or  according to its
original meaning,3 they involve a different subject and inquiry: the role of the judge or
justice  with  regard  to  case  precedent  derived  from  custom  and  practice  and  the
assimilation of cultural norms and standards into the body of rules that govern society. A
constitution fixes the parameters within which a judge or justice may interpret rules and
precedents,  but the methodology of following or revising precedent is still  settled by
common law traditions and hermeneutics to a great extent, even in the United States.4 
2 The paradigm of a static common law results from the messy incorporation of the British
common law into the legal system of the former colonies during the early years of the
American  Republic.5 The  common  law  was  never  permanently  stable,  unified,  or
complete; however, it did include a definite and operational set of rules in Britain when
the  colonies  sought  to  implement  it  in  their  legal  training  and  methods.6 The  two
paradigms  for  the  common  law  seem  like  an  irresolvable  dichotomy,  but  they  are
permeable: in theory, both necessarily exclude the other, but in practice the separation is
not total and the difference not obvious. 
3 Throughout his legal writing and in his book The Common Law, Holmes presented the
common law as evolutionary rather than static.7 In the third paragraph of The Common
Law he cautioned against the error of “supposing, because an idea seems familiar and
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natural to us, that it has always been so” (Holmes 1881: 1). His notion of the common law
was rooted in “historicism and Darwinian natural selection” (Alschuler 2000: 87). Holmes
admired  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  his  British  pen pal  and  a  popular  jurist,  and  Pollock
admired Darwin and modeled his jurisprudence on evolutionary theory.  Pollock once
stated in a letter to Holmes that “I have been turning over the life of a much greater man,
C. Darwin. His letters are about the most fair-minded and charitable a much attached man
ever wrote” (“Letter to Holmes from Sir Frederick Pollock,” November 14, 1923). Harold
Laski seemed to be reading Darwin regularly and dashing off missives to Holmes that
praised Darwin as a great, brilliant, and gentle man. Frederic R. Kellogg (Kellogg 2007) 
picks up on Holmes’s Darwin connection and calls attention to the pragmatic qualities of
Holmes’s evolutionary common-law theories. Kellogg suggests that the common law was
the instantiation of Holmes’s Darwinian pragmatism.
4 The term pragmatism was not in wide circulation during the early years of Holmes’s long
career. Holmes did not declare himself a pragmatist. Nevertheless, the term pragmatism
gained purchase because of such pragmatist thinkers as C. S. Peirce, William James, John
Dewey, Chauncey Wright,  Jane Addams, George Santayana, and George Herbert Mead.
Writers  on  Holmes  have  assigned  the  term  pragmatist to  Holmes’s  common  law
methodology that tropes Darwin. This essay explains why this is fitting and examines the
pragmatic aspects of Holmes’s only book, The Common Law. I limit my discussion of The
Common Law to those “lucid and marvelous periods by which Holmes’ inner struggle is
transformed into insights about the law,” because the other sections of The Common Law
consist  of  “the usual dust of  the law that we all  know” (Touster 1981-2:  684).  I  then
propose something novel: that Emerson’s influence on Holmes contributed to Holmes’s
evolutionary  conception of  the  common law and that  Holmes,  more  than any other
pragmatist, substantiates the claim that Emerson was a pragmatist, proto-pragmatist, or
at least a philosopher who espoused theories that represent pragmatism in embryonic
form. I end my discussion with an invitation to consider how Holmes’s fascination with
Emerson  plays  into  Darwinian  common-law  theory  and  lends  support  for  the
controversial notion that Emerson inaugurated the pragmatist tradition. 
5 The analytical,  positivist,  or  legal  realist  schools  of  jurisprudence as exemplified and
examined by H. L. A. Hart and his progeny have opened up new ways of looking at Holmes
but are at odds with, or uninterested in, the tradition of pragmatist scholarship on which
I focus (i.e., the tradition that can be traced back to Kenneth Burke through Russell B.
Goodman, Giles Gunn, Richard Poirier, Cornel West, Joan Richardson, Jonathan Levin, and
Louis Menand). Over the years I have found research on Hart and Holmes useful and
interesting,  including  works  by  Stephen  R. Perry  and  Anthony  D’Amato,  but  this
scholarship tends to concentrate on the jurisprudence that came after Holmes (i.e., on
spin-offs and seemingly endless interpretations of the “bad man theory”) and not on the
pragmatism  that  came  before  Holmes  or  that  arose  alongside  Holmes  (e.g.,  the
pragmatism of Emerson, Peirce, James, and Dewey). The recalcitrant concentration on
legal realism, the separation of law and morals, the nature of the law, and the is/ought
distinction  have  led  legal  scholars  into  redundancy  and  insularity  and  away  from
pragmatism’s rich and always relevant inquiries into deliberative democracy, pluralism,
metaphysical  realism,  anti-authoritarianism,  aesthetic  experience,  pluralism,  and
instrumentalism. The best starting point for understanding Holmes is not legal realism
and the  like  but  rather  those  figures  like  Emerson and  William James  who actually
corresponded with Holmes,  advised Holmes,  and served as Holmes’s sounding-boards.
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Counterintuitively, returning to pragmatism’s classical roots can revivify the enterprise
of Holmes scholarship by shifting emphasis to the aesthetic features of language, poetry,
representation, and culture,  which interested the young Holmes, who still  considered
himself to be primarily a poet and an artist and not a lawyer or jurist. It is true that, after
the Civil War, during his studies at Harvard Law School and shortly thereafter, Holmes
read Bentham and Austin and seemed to have read every major legal mind in the Anglo-
American legal tradition, and also that the influence of these jurisprudents played into
his  pragmatism,  especially  into  his  “bad  man theory,”  but  I  believe,  with  regard  to
Holmes’s  influences,  these  jurisprudents  are  secondary  to  Emerson and  the  classical
pragmatists. Among legal scholars there is an understandable inclination to view Holmes
through the prism of the jurisprudential writing that came after him while disregarding
the teachings of the non-legal pragmatist thinkers who came before him or who were his
contemporaries during his formative years. A more fruitful and interesting retrospective
approach  to  Holmes,  however,  would  account  for  his  pragmatic  aesthetics  because
Holmes demonstrates that the operational and functional role of artistic signs and forms
shapes the law and legal institutions to varying degrees.
 
Holmes and Pragmatism
6 Kellogg has argued that Holmes’s paradigm for the common law not only “draws heavily
from the historical debate between English legal theorists over the nature and source of
legal  rationality”  but  also  “finds  remarkable  parallels  to  certain  ideas  of  Holmes’s
nonlawyer friends, Chauncey Wright, Charles S. Peirce, William James, and others, among
whom  were  founders  of  the  American  school  of  philosophical  thought  known  as
pragmatism, growing out of the multifaceted influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on
American thought  and the response of  Cambridge intellectuals  to  Darwin’s  Origins  of
Species”  (Kellogg  2007:  14).  Kellogg  is  not  alone  in  spotting  the  connection  between
Holmes,  pragmatism,  Darwin,  and  the  common  law.  In  1943  Paul L. Gregg  described
Holmes’s  pragmatism  as  seeking  out  truth  through  hypothesis,  experiment,  and
community  consensus.  Gregg  called  attention  to  Holmes’s  “delightful  literary  style”
(Gregg 1942-3: 263) and placed Holmes in the tradition of Peirce and James insofar as
Holmes  “refers  to  majority  vote  as  the  test  of  truth”  (Gregg  1942-3:  267).  Holmes’s
pragmatism underwent pointed reproach in the 1940s and was even accused of sharing
the positivist  themes and goals of  Nazism.8 Such tendentious exaggerations were not
widespread and were counterbalanced by more reasonable and levelheaded assessments
just a few years later.9 Attention to Holmes’s pragmatism fell away as general attention to
pragmatism fell away during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. With the explosion of studies on
pragmatism in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  scholarship  on  Holmes  began  to  reconsider  his
relationship to pragmatism and the pragmatists. “[W]hile there are indeed multiple and
apparently clashing strands in Holmes’s thought,” Thomas C. Grey observed at this time,
“most  of  them  weave  together  reasonably  well  when  seen  as  the  jurisprudential
development  of  certain  central  tenets  of  American  pragmatism”  (Grey  1989:  788).
Likewise, Richard Posner pointed out that “Holmes was a friend of Peirce, James, and
other early pragmatists,  and his philosophical  outlook is strongly pragmatic” (Posner
2003: 57). 
7 In 1990, Southern California Law Review held a symposium entitled “The Renaissance of
Pragmatism in American Legal Thought.” Holmes was the catalyst for this renaissance.
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Six years  later  a  conference on Holmes and pragmatism took place at  Brooklyn Law
School to commemorate the 100th anniversary of “The Path of the Law.” Posner was the
keynote speaker. Other speakers included Grey, Catharine Pierce Wells, G. Edward White,
and  Gary  Minda.  A  flurry  of  articles  on  Holmes  and  legal  pragmatism  pursued  the
arguments  put  forth  at  the  conference.10 The  sudden  attention  to  Holmes  led  legal
scholars to contemplate the relationship between pragmatism and the American legal
system.  Richard  Rorty,  seemingly  dismissive  of  the  growing  interest  in  pragmatism
among legal academics, declared, “I think it is true that by now pragmatism is banal in its
application to law” (Rorty 1989-90: 1811). 
8 Others  disagreed,  including  Louis  Menand,  who  recognized  an Emersonian  streak  in
Holmes’s  pragmatism.  Perhaps  more  than  any  other  book,  Menand’s  Pulitzer  Prize
winning The Metaphysical Club generated attention to Holmes’s pragmatism as a response
to the trauma and suffering of the Civil War and to the burgeoning ideas of Darwinian
evolution. Menand also attended to the ways in which Holmes’s boyhood “enthusiasm for
Emerson never faded” and explained how Holmes’s “posture of intellectual isolation” was
“essentially Emersonian” (Menand 2001: 68). Menand thereby complicated the already
ramified literature regarding Emerson’s alleged status as a forerunner to pragmatism.
Scholars  as  wide-ranging as  Burke,11 Goodman,  Gunn,  Poirier,  West,  Richardson,  and
Levin have weighed in on the pragmatic elements of Emerson’s thought. Each of these
scholars missed or failed to account for the manner in which Emerson’s pragmatism bore
out in Holmes’s judicial writings.
9 Holmes’s pragmatism is now established. Susan Haack has announced that “both legal
scholars and historians of philosophy acknowledge Holmes as the first legal pragmatist;
and with good reason, for many themes familiar from the philosophers of the classical
pragmatist tradition can also be found in Holmes’s legal thinking” (Haack 2011: 67-8).
Haack goes on to sketch the most important links between Holmes and the classical
pragmatists; rather than rehashing this sketch, I assume my readers are familiar with it
and will  touch upon only those areas concerning Holmes’s common law theories and
pragmatism.  Given  that  Holmes’s  debt  to  pragmatism  is  no  longer  disputed,  it  is
remarkable that  the still-disputed pragmatism of  Emerson has not been evaluated in
terms of Holmes, especially in light of the fact that Holmes himself, in a letter to Emerson,
articulated the “mark of gratitude and respect I feel for you who more than anyone else
first started the philosophical ferment in my mind” (Novick 1989: 149). Legend has it that
Holmes, at age fourteen, informed Emerson that “[i]f I ever do anything, I shall owe a
great deal to you” (Baker 1991: 85; Menand 2001: 25). Holmes is rumored to have sought
out Emerson’s autograph in 1862 (Baker 1991: 125), and on his seventeenth birthday his
parents presented him with two volumes of Emerson’s essays (Menand 2001: 22). What
elements of Emerson’s thought might have guided Holmes’s approach to the common
law? How might Emerson’s drive to renew past paradigms parallel the judge’s handling of
settled case precedents in matters of immediate urgency?
 
Holmes’s Common Law
10 To avoid getting tangled in the “desperately confusing scholarly mare’s nest” resulting
from “a divergence of the legal meaning(s) of a word [pragmatism] from its philosophical
meanings”  (Haack  2005:  74),  Holmes  should  be  considered  alongside  the  classical
pragmatists and not alongside the neopragmatists12 because the latter tradition sullied
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and distorted pragmatism, at least according to Haack.13 Regardless of whether Haack is
correct, the conceivable parameters of pragmatism would have been different before the
mid-20th  century  trends  and  advances  in  analytical  or  language-based  philosophies
gained traction in legal theory. Holmes intended the lectures that made up The Common
Law “to take up from time to time the cardinal principles and conceptions of the law and
make a new and more fundamental analysis of them […] [f]or the purpose of constructing
a new Jurisprudence or New First Book of the law” (Gordon 1992: 2). Viewing Holmes
through the lens  of  neopragmatism can cause one to  forget  there  was  a  time when
Holmes’s theories were considered novel and when it would have been unthinkable for
someone to declare that “everybody seems to now be a legal realist. Nobody wants to talk
about a ‘science of law’ any longer. Nobody doubts that what Morton White called ‘the
revolt  against  formalism’  was  a  real  advance,  both  in  legal  theory  and in  American
intellectual life generally.” (Rorty 1989-90: 1811). 
11 Kellogg is an excellent starting point for approaching Holmes’s theories of the common
law because he avoids the anachronistic application of neopragmatist ideas in his study of
Holmes and situates Holmes’s common-law theories alongside canonical thinkers on the
subject: Sir Edward Coke, Thomas Hobbes, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone.
These figures were by no measure uniform in their understanding of the common law;
their ideas diverged widely and continue to demonstrate how common law theory is
never settled. Precisely because it is never settled, the common law is ripe for theoretical
appropriation. Holmes was able to put his own mark on it in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth  centuries.  “It  would  seem,”  says  Kellogg,  “that  nothing  quite  like  the
intellectual  background  of  Darwinian  evolution  and  [Chauncey]  Wright-influenced
fallibilism could be found in previous theoretical writings about the common law, and it
is  evident that Holmes himself  believed his theory to be original” (Kellogg 2007:  47).
Darwin’s Origins of Species did not appear until 1859, just 21 years before the publication of
The Common Law, and Chauncey Wright was Holmes’s friend and contemporary. Holmes
himself admitted that as a young man he had absorbed Darwinism without having read
much of it: “The Origin of Species I think came out while I was in college – H. Spencer had
announced his intention to put the universe into our pockets – I hadn’t read either of
them to be sure, but as I say it was in the air” (Holmes to Morris Cohen, in The Essential
Holmes 1992: 110). When Holmes died, a marked-up copy of Darwin’s The Origin of Species
was found among his books (Baker 1991: 84).
12 It has been said that “it is quite impossible to understand and appreciate the judicial
method of Justice Holmes without taking into account the fact that he was steeped in the
tradition of the common law” (Wu 1960-1: 222). Holmes’s career spanned some of the
most transitional eras of American history; widely accepted notions of the common law
changed during various periods of his life. Many of those changes are attributable to him.
14 He  pushed American jurisprudence  away from the  Blackstonian conception of  the
common law that had appealed to the founding generation15 and that had been dealt a
heavy blow by the Civil War and Reconstruction.16
13 Kellogg summarizes Blackstone’s conception of the common law as a fixed entity that is
universal, continuous, valid because of its long standing, and customary (Kellogg 2007:
48-9). Like Coke and Hale, Blackstone envisioned the common law as the institutional
perfection of human reason that was separate from codified legislation (Kellogg 2007:
48-9).17 As  against  statutory  commands,  Blackstone  referred  to the  common  law  as
unwritten  law (Blackstone  1996:  63)  or  “the  monuments  and  evidences  of  our  legal
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customs [as] contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in books of reports
and judicial decisions, and in the treaties of learned sages of the profession, preserved
and handed down to us from the times of highest antiquity” (Blackstone 1996: 62-3). He
acknowledged that the common law was rooted in binding oral traditions and submitted
that “[o]ur ancient lawyers […] insist with abundance of warmth, that these customs are
as old as the primitive Britons, and continued down, through the several mutations of
government  and  inhabitants,  to  the  present  time,  unchanged  and  unadulterated”
(Blackstone 1996: 64). Whether these appeals to antiquity and claims of unbroken lineage
were  intended  to  validate judicial  power  or  engender  national  pride  is  a  matter  of
scholarly debate that exceeds the scope of this essay.18 Suffice it to say that with some
exceptions Blackstone portrayed the common law as a static canon dating from time
immemorial and that his notions of natural law attracted religious traditionalists as well
as  Enlightenment  intellectuals  who  extolled  the  powers  of  human  reason  that
purportedly  discriminated  between  competing  ideas  to  discern  the  true  laws  that
governed the universe.19 
14 Blackstone’s  insistence  upon  the  “unchanged”  and  “unadulterated”  aspect  of  the
common law is inapposite to Holmes’s conception of the common law as a spontaneously
ordered  system  of  growth.  Blackstone  viewed  the  common  law  as  divorced  from
legislation (Kellogg 2007: 54-5), as a “judicial prerogative” set against “a transformative
tide toward majoritarian legislation and central government” (Kellogg 2007: 55), and as a
“defense of embedded, and not entirely well reasoned or intentioned, practices” (Kellogg
2007:  55).  Holmes  more  than  Blackstone  took  into  account  the  manifold  rules  and
regulations that were not judicially made:  the countless acts of the state and federal
legislatures (Kellogg 2007: 56). Also more than Blackstone, Holmes accounted for the role
of the sovereign, through its legislature, to confer rights and duties upon its citizens. In
Blackstone’s  paradigm,  the  sovereign  was the  king,  who  shared  his  power  with  the
legislature or Parliament, but in Holmes’s it was an executive and legislative branch in a
maturing American Republic or democracy. 
15 For Holmes the judge did not divine pure law or right reason by consulting the wisdom of
the  ages  as  embodied  in  enduring  case  precedent  but  considered  “intractable  legal
disputes [as] bearing a certain degree of unforeseen novelty or originality” while treating
the “legal profession, in concert with the community at large, [as] work[ing] out a gradual
resolution through progressive abstraction from specific cases” (Kellogg 2007:  56).  As
Holmes put it, “The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so
far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery,
and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its
past.” (Holmes 1881: 1).  This observation about the law is in keeping with Emerson’s
imperative to “let the breath of new life be breathed by you through the forms already
existing” (Emerson 1883: 147). Emerson, like Holmes, rejected “[a]ll attempts to project
and  establish  a  Cultus  with  new  rites  and  forms”  (Emerson  1883:  147)  and  instead
encouraged individuals to “employ the symbols in use in his day and nation” because “the
new […] is always formed out of the old” (Emerson 1996: 431). Emerson invoked the spirit
of common-law adjudication in “The American Scholar” when he discussed books as past
authorities  that  facilitated  future  inspiration  and  advancement  as  though  books
themselves were precedential laws that bound artists even as they liberated those same
artists into creative freedom (Emerson 1996: 56-9). Following Emerson, Holmes projected
onto the common law a vision of  history and influence in which present  forms and
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conditions  were  revisions  and  extensions  of  past  forms  and  conditions.  Holmes
envisioned common-law judges to be inventors like Emerson’s artists with the important
proviso that “the inventor only knows how to borrow” (Emerson 1996: 634). 
16 Although Holmes went beyond Blackstone in acknowledging the plain historical fact that
codification was on the rise and increasingly displacing the common law tradition, he
remained  enamored  with  the  common law.  The  irony  of  The  Common  Law  is  that  it
describes  a  “theory  of  the  judiciary  alone,  limited  to  the  special  conditions  of  the
common law development during a period before legislation became the dominant mode
of lawmaking” (Touster 1981-2: 693). Holmes’s tome about judicial and precedential law
appeared at a time when “legislation had become the acknowledged and central means by
which the state pursued social ends” (Touster 1981-2: 693). Holmes’s awareness of this
tendency toward immense legislative classifications, more obvious and severe in his day
than  in  Blackstone’s,  had  to  do  with  his  unique  understanding  of  the  positivism of
Thomas Hobbes and John Austin, whose theories he had challenged and rejected (Kellogg
2007:  58).  The  Common  Law might  have  mimicked  Sir  Henry  Maine’s  Ancient  Law  in
organization and framework as well as in its subtle and mostly implied recognition that
law had been graduating from the supposedly inherent reason of the common law system
to the rigid logic of positivism.20 “Maine proposed […] that law, in its formal aspects,
moves from a period of legal fictions to one of equity or case-law to one of legislation,”
and Holmes “seems to  have been determined to  do a  comparable  work of  historical
analysis for the common law and even went so far as to structure his book chapter by
chapter on the model of Maine’s work” (Touster 1981-2: 684). 
17 Unlike Maine, Holmes sought to incorporate the latest science into his jurisprudence,
“apparently go[ing] further than Maine by using the new biological and anthropological
materials on evolution that the Darwinian revolution in thought was providing” (Touster
1981-2:  684).  Holmes’s  apparent  Darwinism  dovetailed  with  pragmatism.  His
jurisprudence  has  been  called  “evolutionary  pragmatism”  (Gordon  1981-2:  721).
“According to this idea,” explains one scholar,  “no legal  form has a frozen meaning;
rather, legal forms are changing and contingent and depend on the specific practical uses
to which successive generations wish to put them. The form may stay the same, but the
content changes with changing views of policy – the policy upon which all  law must
ultimately  be  grounded.”  (Gordon  1981-2:  721).  The  primary  difference  between
Blackstone and Holmes is that the former embraces a common-law paradigm consisting
of  fixed  rules  rooted  in  ancient  custom whereas  the  latter  embraces  a  common-law
paradigm consisting of  fluid rules  responsive to changing social  conditions.  Holmes’s
common-law paradigm reveals  his  indebtedness  to  Emerson,  who  availed  himself  of
pragmatic superfluities of language to ensure the continuity and freshness of old ideas in
new contexts. The term superfluity signifies the creative urge to overcome, outdo, move
beyond,  facilitate,  generate,  push forward,  transcend,  outlast,  or  surpass.  Like genius
according to Emerson,  superfluity “looks forward” and “creates” (Emerson 1996:  58).
Superfluous language “smites  and arouses” with its  “tones,”  “breaks up” our “whole
chain of habits,” and “opens” our eyes to our own “possibilities” (Emerson 1983: 409). It is
characterized by an extravagance of style that consists of sound, metaphor, rhythm, and
complexity. Poirier suggests that Emersonian superfluity counteracts repose in writing
and  ideas  and  involves  “a  kind  of  rapid  or  wayward  movement  of  voice”  that  “is
associated […] with speed” and a “momentum or volatility of style” (Poirier 1992: 45).
Superfluity  is  about  “generative  interaction”  (Poirier  1992:  47),  “a  struggle  with
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language” (Poirier 1992: 50) or the “continuous struggle with language” (Poirier 1992: 67),
“creative energy” (Poirier 1992: 50), a “commitment” to “more than is necessary [for the]
survival” of ideas and influences (Poirier 1992: 55), “accelerations of a process” (Poirier
1992:  55),  the  “power  of  invention”  (Poirier  1992:  57),  an  “overwhelming  excess  of
productivity” (Poirier 1992: 58), “words in excess of the minimum daily requirements of
human beings” (Poirier 1992: 58), the “plenitude and power of language” that propels
one’s “voice into the future” (Poirier 1992: 60), “the power for new creation” (Poirier
1992: 71), “generative” and “creative power” (Poirier 1992: 73), “engendering” (Poirier
1992: 74), and “speaking to a posterity in no way bound by th[e] discourse” in which
people  in  their  specific  time  and  place  are  immersed.  All  of  these  notions  are
emphatically against “a loss of creative powers” (Poirier 1992: 47), “immobility” (Poirier
1992: 59), “stand still” (Poirier 1992: 58), “the stasis achieved by former movements that
have become textualized or intellectualized” (Porier 1992: 65), and “bareness” (Poirier
1992:  70-1).  Emersonian  superfluity  finds  expression  in  Holmes’s  sparkling  judicial
writing that calls attention to itself and thereby ensures that his rules and reasoning
attract future audiences and reach beyond their present moment.
 
The Common Law and Pragmatism
18 Haack lists the following features of Holmes’s jurisprudence that are compatible with
traditional common law theory that flies in the face of legal positivism and underplays
the role of legislatures in transmitting laws to the public: the prediction theory of law
(Haack 2011:  68);  the  growth and adaptation of  legal  concepts  (Haack 2011:  69);  the
evolution of legal systems (Haack 2011: 70); the past and the future of the law (Haack
2011: 71);  the relevance of the sciences,  and especially the social sciences, to the law
(Haack 2011: 71); and moral fallibilism (Haack 2011: 72). Each of these features of Holmes’s
pragmatism participates with one another; none exists to the exclusion of the others.
Holmes’s  dogged insistence that  law and morality were separate or only incidentally
aligned, for instance, brought about his reasonable man theory of negligence that turned
on the  foreseeable  consequences  of  a  given  human action.  This  theory  captures  his
signature concept of law as prediction,21 grows out of his prior theories of negligence,22
and incorporates moral fallibilism insofar as it proposes that a tortfeasor is not judged
according to his particular state of mind but according to an objective standard about
how reasonable people in general ought to behave in light of their circumstances.23 
19 The Common Law, which is only a brief introduction to Holmes’s jurisprudence, touches
upon each of the features mentioned by Haack. Here is Holmes on the prediction theory
of law: 
The  degree  of  apprehension  may  affect  the  decision,  as  well  as  the  degree  of
probability that the crime will be accomplished. (Holmes 1881: 46) 
There must be an intent to deprive such owner of his ownership therein, it is said.
But why? Is  it  because the law is  more anxious not to put a man in prison for
stealing unless he is actually wicked, than it is not to hang him for killing another?
That can hardly be. The true answer is, that the intent is an index to the external
event which probably would have happened, and that, if the law is to punish at all,
it must, in this case, go on probabilities, not on accomplished facts. (Holmes 1881: 
48) 
The only guide for the future to be drawn from a decision against a defendant in an
action  of  tort  is  that  similar  acts,  under  circumstances  which  cannot  be
distinguished except by the result from those of the defendant, are done at the peril
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of the actor; that if he escapes liability, it is simply because by good fortune no
harm comes of his conduct in the particular event. (Holmes 1881: 54)
20 Here is Holmes on the growth and adaptation of legal concepts and the evolution of legal
systems: 
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics. (Holmes 1881: 1) 
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or formula. In the
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
themselves  to  inquire  how  it  is  to  be  accounted  for.  Some  ground  of  policy  is
thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of
things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found
for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives new content, and in time
even the form modifies itself  to fit  the meaning which it  has received.  (Holmes
1881: 3-4) 
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It
is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old
ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It
will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow. (Holmes 1881: 25)
However  much we may codify  the  law into  a  series  of  seemingly  self-sufficient
propositions,  those  propositions  will  be  but  a  phase  in  a  continuous  growth.
(Holmes 1881: 25) 
If truth were not often suggested by error, if old impediments could not be adjusted
to new uses, human progress would be slow. But scrutiny and revision are justified.
(Holmes 1881: 25)
21 Here is Holmes on the past and the future of the law: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time,  the prevalent  moral  and political  theories,  intuitions  of  public  policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed. (Holmes 1881: 1) 
The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it
goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery,
and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much
upon its past. (Holmes 1881: 1)
The reader may begin to ask for the proof that all this has any bearing on our law of
today. So far as concerns the influence of the Roman law upon our own, especially
the Roman law of master and servant, the evidence of it is to be found in every book
which has been written for the last five hundred years. (Holmes 1881: 12)
When ancient  rules  maintain  themselves  in  the  way  that  has  been  and will  be
shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them,
and […] they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the
grounds to which they have been transplanted. (Holmes 1881: 24) 
To understand [laws’] scope fully, to know how they will be dealt with by judges
trained in the past which the law embodies, we must ourselves know something of
that past. The history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of
what the law is. (Holmes 1881: 25) 
22 It is difficult to find in The Common Law precise examples of how Holmes incorporates the
sciences, and especially the social sciences, into the law, because the book is itself an
exercise in social science that tropes Darwin while mentioning relevant scholarship in the
appropriate places. Here, however, is one example: 
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There are crimes which do not excite [revenge], and we should naturally expect
that the most important purposes of punishment would be coextensive with the
whole field of its application. It remains to be discovered whether such a general
purpose exists, and if so what it is. Different theories still divide opinion upon the
subject. (Holmes 1881: 29)
23 Forays into science appear more elaborately in Holmes’s  opinions as  a  United States
Supreme Court justice. In Darling v. City of Newport, for example, he stated with seeming
authority that the “ocean hitherto has been treated as open to the discharge of sewage
from the cities upon its shores. Whatever science may accomplish in the future we are
not aware that it yet has discovered any generally accepted way of avoiding the practical
necessity of so using the great natural purifying basin.” (Darling v. City of Newport 1919:
542-3). Thirteen years earlier he had carefully examined scientific studies about bridges,
water, typhoid, and navigation to prepare for his opinion in State of Missouri v. State of
Illinois, in which he wrote that “the evidence now is in, the actual facts have required for
their establishment the most ingenious experiments,  and for their interpretation the
most subtle speculations, of modern science, and therefore it becomes necessary at the
present stage to consider somewhat more nicely than heretofore how the evidence in it is
to be approached” (State of Missouri v. State of Illinois 1906: 268). He then undertook an
exacting  analysis,  dividing  the  plaintiff’s  and  the  defendant’s  experts  into  opposing
factions:
We assume the now-prevailing scientific explanation of typhoid fever to be correct.
But when we go beyond that assumption, everything is involved in doubt. The data
upon which an increase in the deaths from typhoid fever in St. Louis is alleged are
disputed. The elimination of other causes is denied. The experts differ as to the
time and distance within which a stream would purify itself. No case of an epidemic
caused by infection at so remote a source is brought forward and the cases which
are produced are controverted. […] The distance in which the sewage has to travel
(357  miles)  is  not  open  to  debate,  but  the  time  of  transit,  to  be  inferred  from
experiments with floats, is estimated as varying from eight to eighteen and a half
days, with forty-eight hours more from intake to distribution, and when corrected
by  observations  of  bacteria  is  greatly  prolonged  by  the  defendants.  The
experiments of the defendant’s experts lead them to the opinion that a typhoid
bacillus could not survive the journey, while those on the other side maintain that
it might live and keep its power for twenty-five days or more, and arrive at St. 
Louis. Upon the question at issue, whether the new discharge from Chicago hurts
St. Louis, there is a categorical contradiction between the experts on the two sides. (
State of Missouri v. State of Illinois 1906: 523)
24 Holmes went on to discuss the quantity of  bacteria and typhoid bacillus in the river
water, the speed of the river current in relation to the distance that germs could travel
downstream, and the degree of  danger of  the bacteria within quick-moving currents
compared to bacteria in stagnant water. 
25 In Steward v. American Lava Co. Holmes evaluated a patent for acetylene gas burners as well
as their processes for burning gas. He described acetylene gas as follows:
It is very rich in carbon, and therefore has great illuminating power, but, for the
same reason, coupled with the relatively low heat at which it dissociates and sets
carbon free, it deposited soot or unconsumed carbon, and soon clogged the burners
then in use. It was possible to secure a complete consumption of carbon by means
of the wellknown Bunsen burner. This consists of a tube or cylinder pierced on the
sides with holes for the admission of the air, into one end of which a fine stream of
gas is projected through a minute aperture, and from the other end of which it
escapes and then is burned. A high pressure is necessary for the gas in order to
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prevent its burning back. The ordinary use of the Bunsen burner is to develop heat,
and  to  that  end  a  complete  combustion,  of  course,  as  desired.  But,  with  an
immediately complete combustion, there is little light. The yellow light of candles
and gas jets is due to free particles of carbon at a red heat, but not yet combined
with oxygen, or, as we commonly say, consumed. On the appearance of acetylene
gas, inventors at once sought to apply the principle of the Bunsen burner with such
modifications as would produce this result. In doing so, they found it best to use
duplex burners, – that is burners the outlets of which were inclined toward each
other so that the meeting of the two streams of gas formed a flat flame, and to let in
less air. (Steward v. American Lava Co. 1909: 162)
26 He then stated, “We should regret to be compelled to decide a case by the acceptance or
rejection of a theoretic explanation upon which it  still  is  possible that authorities in
science disagree” (Steward v. American Lava Co. 1909: 166). These three cases strengthen
Haack’s claim that science and social science were features of Holmes’s jurisprudence.
Finally, here is Holmes, in The Common Law, discussing moral fallibilism: 
If punishment stood on the moral grounds which are proposed for it, the first thing
to be considered would be those limitations in the capacity for choosing rightly
which arise from abnormal instincts, want of education, lack of intelligence, and all
the other defects which are most marked in criminal classes. I do not say that they
should not be, or at least I do not need to for my argument. I do not say that the
criminal  law  does  more  good  than  harm.  I  only  say  that  it  is  not  enacted  or
administered on that theory. (Holmes 1881: 31)
The law of torts abounds in moral phraseology. It has much to say of wrongs, of
malice, fraud, intent, and negligence. Hence it may naturally be supposed that the
risk of a man’s conduct is  thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-
coming. But while this notion has been entertained, the extreme opposite will be
found to have been a far more popular opinion; – I mean the notion that a man is
answerable for all the consequences of his acts, or, in other words, that he acts at
his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the
matter. (Holmes 1881: 54-5) 
[A]lthough the law starts from the distinctions and uses the language of morality, it
necessarily ends in external standards not dependent on the actual consciousness
of the individual. So it has happened with fraud. If a man makes a representation,
knowing facts which by the average standard of the community are sufficient to
give him warning that it is probably untrue, and it is untrue, he is guilty of fraud in
theory of law whether he believes his statement or not. (Holmes 1881: 217-8)
27 These are mere samplings.  Much of The Common Law substantiates Haack’s point that
Holmes entertained and employed pragmatic theories that represented the evolutionary
theories animating the common law. Kellogg suggests that insofar as Holmes’s conception
of the law offers a model of an “ongoing community exploring common problems,” it
bears “remarkable similarities to the model of scientific inquiry emerging at roughly the
same historical period in the writings of Holmes’s controversial friend Charles S. Peirce, a
model later adopted by John Dewey” (Kellogg 2007: 34). The class poet at Harvard, the son
of the famous poet and man of letters, and a protégé of Emerson, Holmes marries the
analytical tradition of pragmatism and the aesthetic tradition of pragmatism explored in
the works of Burke, Goodman, Gunn, Poirier, West, Richardson, and Levin. 
28 Holmes’s “underlying conception of  society” reflects his “exposure to the struggle of
Darwinian evolution” (Kellogg 2007:  94).  This conception was “much discussed in the
Metaphysical Club and confirmed in some respects by the American Civil War, both of
which  reinforced  doubts concerning  the  prospects  for  [the]  law-based  liberal  or
utilitarian reform” (Kellogg 2007: 94). Kellogg purports that Holmes “looked backward to
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common law as  the  archetypal  decentralized model,  modified  in  the  spirit  of  public
inquiry, parallel to the Peircean model of scientific inquiry and problem solving, balanced
with  a  comprehensibility  and  predictability  derived  from  the  spread  of  external
standards” (Kellogg 2007: 95). To this end, Holmes viewed the judge’s role as receptive to
existing cultures at local levels and considered order itself to be “decentralized, supple,
[…] unfinished, [and] constantly under construction and revision” (Kellogg 2007: 95). He
was unlikely to deem as unconstitutional any enacted legislation and in fact did so only
once during his twenty-year career (1882-1902) on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. He disapproved of legislation only if it abridged freedom of speech, and he grew
committed to the notion that a marketplace of ideas was necessary for the best theories
to  outdo  competitors  and  prove  their  practical  worth.  Holmes’s  jurisprudence
commemorates  judges  as  cultural  interpreters subject  to  “community-approved
standards  and  precedents  [that]  derive  from  ancient  rules”  (Kellogg  2007:  122).  He
believed that judges ought not to “set the policy so much as be aware of it,” although they
“could and should update the reasoning” about how to apply old concepts in the current
environment (Kellogg 2007: 122). 
29 What  sets  Holmes  apart from other  classical  pragmatists  is  not  just  his  station as  a
Supreme  Court  justice  but  his  commitment  to  Emersonian  thought  and  aesthetics.
Emerson “put the living generation into masquerade” out of the “faded wardrobe” of the
past  (Emerson  1983:  547)  just  as  Holmes  discussed  the  “form of  continuity”  that  is
“nothing but the evening dress which the new-comer puts on to make itself presentable
according  to  conventional  requirements”  (Holmes  1880:  234).  Holmes  never  forgot
Emerson. He published The Common Law in 1881. In 1882, Emerson died. The year between
1881 and 1882 represents the passing of a baton as Holmes preserved Emerson’s ideas and
aesthetics but stripped them of  the characteristics and qualities that were no longer
suited for the postwar era.24 Holmes was an Emersonian and a pragmatist, and if there
were a model for how those two traditions coincide it  is  in Holmes’s famous judicial
dissents that mobilize the common law system within the constitutional framework by
undermining current  case  precedents  while  anticipating and establishing future  case
precedents. 
30 Much ink has been spilled over the vexed issue of Emerson’s putative pragmatism. It
should go without  saying that  Emerson’s  status as  a pragmatist  has been challenged
repeatedly and most  memorably in Stanley Cavell’s  essay “What’s  the Use in Calling
Emerson a Pragmatist?” It is not worth defending or refuting Emerson’s alleged standing
as a pragmatic thinker here because, at this point, the “notion that Emerson is a seminal
figure  or  precursor  for  American  pragmatism  is  no  longer  new  or  controversial”
(Albrecht 2012: 18). Cavell’s question has yielded various arguments, but scholars have
yet to formulate a response in terms of Holmes,  who was not only a member of the
Metaphysical  Club  but  also  a  protégé of  Emerson.  Haack’s  work  on  Holmes  and  the
common law provides an opportunity for those working in and advocating an Emersonian
pragmatic tradition to outflank their antagonists by tapping into both the aesthetic and
classical  pragmatist  traditions in the person of  Holmes.  It  might be that  Emersonian
superfluity bears out in Holmes’s judicial opinions and dissents, which themselves form
and respond to a canon of case precedents. In the context of common-law judging Holmes
unites  with  the  analytical  tradition  of  pragmatism  Emerson’s  emphasis  on  “life,
transition, and the emerging spirit” as the driving forces behind the evolution of arts and
culture (Emerson 1983: 413). By dissenting with lively language and an emerging spirit
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Holmes guaranteed the “generative, agonistic interplay between power and limitation”
that  propels  the  common-law  system  forward,  preserving  what  precedents  remain
constructive and shaking off those holdings which are no longer fitful in the changed
environment (Albrecht 2012: 62). “Emerson value[d] processes but not necessarily their
end  products,”  Poirier  said,  “which  are  in  any  event  only  instruments  of  further
processes” (Poirier 1992: 2). Holmes saw in the common law the instantiation of these
pragmatic processes that Emerson valued. Until scholars of pragmatism fully account for
Holmes’s Emersonian role in the pragmatic tradition, answers to Cavell’s question will
remain incomplete and insufficient. To know what use it is to call Emerson a pragmatist
requires us to look for Emerson’s influence in Holmes’s judicial writings that bear directly
and practically on our society through the medium of legal cases.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALBRECHT J. M., (2012), Reconstructing Individualism: A Pragmatic Tradition from Emerson to Ellison,
New York, Fordham University Press. 
ALSCHULER A. W., (1997), “Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later,” 
Florida Law Review 49, 353-420. 
ALSCHULER A. W., (2000), Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes, Chicago and
London, University of Chicago Press. 
BADER W. D., (1994-5), “Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism,” Vermont Law
Review 19, 5-18. 
BAKER L., (1991), The Justice from Beacon Hill: The Life and Times of Oliver Wendell Holmes, New York,
HarperCollins. 
BALKIN J. M., (2012), “The Roots of the Living Constitution,” Boston University Law Review 92,
1129-1160. 
BERNSTEIN D. E., (2003), “Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy,” Texas Law Review 82, 1-64. 
BLACKSTONE W, (1966), Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First, 1765, London, Dawsons of
Pall Mall.
BLASI V., (2004), “Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas,” Supreme Court Review, 1-45. 
BROWN R. B. & B. A. KIMBALL (2001), “When Holmes Borrowed from Langdell: The Ultra Legal
Formalism and Public Policy of Northern Securities (1904),” American Journal of Legal History 45,
278-321. 
BURKE K., (1952), A Grammar of Motives, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
CHROUST A., (1949), “Blackstone Revisited,” University of Kansas City Law Review 17, 24-34. 
COKE S. E., (2003), The Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Edward Coke, S. Sheppard, ed.,
Indianapolis, Indiana, Liberty Fund.
Darling v. City of Newport (1919), 249 U.S. 540. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
13
EMERSON R. W., (1883), “Divinity School Address,” in The Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Boston,
Jefferson Press. 
EMERSON R. W., (1983), “Circles” and “Nature,” in Essays and Lectures, J. Porte, ed., New York,
Library of America. 
EMERSON R. W., (1996), “Art,” “The American Scholar,” “Plato; or, The Philosopher,” in Emerson’s
Essays & Poems, J. Porte, H. Bloom, & P. Kane, eds., New York, Library of America.
FISHER L. E., (2001), “Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical
Reality,” New Mexico Law Review 31, 455-492. 
FRIEDMAN B., (2001), “History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner,” New York University Law Review 76, 1383-1455. 
GORDON R. W., (1981-82), “Holmes’s Common Law as Legal and Social Science,” Hofstra Law Review 
10, 719-746. 
GORDON R. W., (1992), “Introduction,” The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., R. W. Gordon, ed.,
Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
GORDON R. W., (1996), “The Struggle Over the Past,” Cleveland State Law Review 44, 123-144. 
GREGG P. L., (1942-43), “The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes,” Georgetown Law Journal 31,
262-295. 
GREY T. C., (1978), “Origins of the Unwritten Constitution,” Stanford Law Review 30, 843-893. 
GREY T. C., (1989), “Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,” Stanford Law Review 41, 787-870. 
HAACK S., (2005), “On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does ‘The Path of the Law’ Lead Us?,” American
Journal of Jurisprudence 50, 71-105. 
HAACK S., (2008), “The Pluralistic Universe of Law: Towards a Neo-Classical Legal Pragmatism,” 
Ratio Juris 21, 453-80. 
HAACK S., (2011), “Pragmatism, Law, and Morality: The Lessons of Buck v. Bell,” European Journal of
Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (2), 65-87. 
HALE S. M., (1713), The History of the Common Law of England, Stafford, England, J. Nutt, assignee of
Edw. Sayer for J. Walthoe. 
HART Jr. H. M., (1951), “Holmes’ Positivism – An Addendum,” Harvard Law Review 64, 929-937. 
HOLMES Jr. O. W., (1880), “Book Notices,” The American Law Review 14, 233-35. 
HOLMES Jr. O. W., (1881), The Common Law, Chicago, American Bar Association. 
HOLMES Jr. O. W., (1897), “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review 110, 457-478.
HOLMES Jr. O. W., Letter to A.G. Sedgwick, 12 July 1879, quoted in R. W. Gordon (1981), “Holmes’ 
Common Law as Legal and Social Science,” Hofstra Law Review 10, 719-746. 
HOWE M. D., (1950-1), “Holmes’s Positivism – A Brief Rejoinder,” Harvard Law Review 64, 937-939. 
HOWE M. D., (1951), “The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes,” Harvard Law Review 64, 529-546.
KELLOGG F. R., (2007), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Legal Theory, and Judicial Restraint, Cambridge
University Press.
KONIG D., (2010), “James Madison and Common-Law Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 28,
507-514. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
14
“Letter to Holmes from Sir Frederick Pollock,” November 14, 1923, Harvard University Holmes
Digital Suite, M. D. Howe’s research materials on Holmes, 1858-1968: Finding Aid, Complete set of
typescripts, interfiled, 1923-1924. 
LEVINE A. M. & D. S. MALACHUK, (2011), A Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Lexington,
Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press.
LOBBAN M., (1987), “Blackstone and the Science of Law,” The Historical Journal 30, 311-335. 
MATSUDA M. J., (1990), “Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem,” Southern
California Law Review 63, 1763-1782. 
McGrath v. Panama R. Co. (1924) 298 F. 303, 1924 A.M.C. 1328 (5th Cir. App.). 
MCKNIGHT J. W., (1959), “Blackstone, Quasi-Jurisprudent,” Southwestern Law Journal 13, 399-411. 
MENAND L., (2001), The Metaphysical Club, New York, Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
MENDENHALL A., (2010), “Jefferson’s ‘Laws of Nature’: Newtonian Influence and the Dual Valence of
Jurisprudence and Science,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23, 319-334. 
MENDENHALL A., (2011), “Holmes and Dissent,” The Journal Jurisprudence 12, 679-726. 
MENDENHALL A., (2012), “Dissent as a Site of Aesthetic Adaptation in the Work of Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr.,” British Journal of American Legal Studies 1, 517-550.
MEYLER B., (2006), “Towards a Common Law Originalism,” Stanford Law Review 59, 551-600. 
MILLER J. G., (2000), “Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin,” Pace
Law Review 20, 409-432. 
MINOW M. & E. SPELMAN, (1990), “In Context,” Southern California Law Review 63, 1597-1652. 
NOLAN D. R., (1976), “Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of
Intellectual Impact,” New York University Law Review 51, 731-768. 
NOVICK S. M., (1989), Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Little, Brown & Co.
PALMER B. W., (1945), “Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler,” American Bar Journal 31, 569-573. 
PALMER B. W., (1946), “Defense Against Leviathan,” American Bar Journal 32, 328-332. 
PALMER B. W., (1951), “The Totalitarianism of Mr. Justice Holmes: Another Chapter in the
Controversy,” American Bar Journal 37, 809-811.
PARKER K., (2003), “The History of Experience: On the Historical Imagination of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 26, 60-82. 
PEARCEY N. R., (2000-1), “Darwin’s New Bulldogs: Scopes and American Legal Philosophy,” Regent
University Law Review 13, 483-511. 
PLUCKNETT T. F. T., (2010), A Concise History of the Common Law, Indianapolis, Indiana, Liberty Fund,
Inc. 
POIRIER R., (1992), Poetry and Pragmatism, London and Boston, Faber and Faber.
POSNER R., (2003), Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Harvard University Press.
RADIN M. J., (1990), “The Pragmatist and the Feminist,” Southern California Law Review 63,
1699-1726. 
RORTY R., (1989-90), “The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice,” Southern California
Law Review 63, 1811-1819. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
15
SCHANCK P. C., (1992), “Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review 65, 2505-2597. 
SCHOR M., (2010-1), “Contextualizing the Debate Between Originalism and the Living
Constitution,” Drake Law Review 59, 961-972. 
State of Missouri v. State of Illinois (1906), 200 U.S. 496. 
Steward v. American Lava Co. (1909), 215 U.S. 161. 
STRASSER M., (2003), “Why Theories of Law Have Little or Nothing to Do with Judicial Restraint,” 
Colorado Law Review 74, 1379-1408. 
STRAUSS D., (1996), “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,” The University of Chicago Law
Review 63, 877-935. 
The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., (1992), R. Posner, ed., Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
TOUSTER S., (1981-2), “Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory,” Hofstra
Law Review 10, 673-718. 
United States v. Faw (1807) 1 Cranch C.C. 456, 25 F. Cas. 1052, 1. D.C. 456, No. 15, 077 (Circuit Court,
District of Columbia). 
United States v. Pascacio-Rodriguez (2014) [2014 WL 1407541, April 11, 2014] (5th Circ. App.). 
United States v. Willis (1808), 1 Cranch C.C. 511, 28 F. Cas. 698, 1 D.C. 511, No. 16, 728 (Circuit Court,
District of Columbia). 
Van Ness v. Pacard (1829), 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 137, 144. 
WATERMAN J. S., (1932-3), “Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Illinois Law Review 
27, 629-659. 
WEISBERG R. H., (1996), “It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist, It’s a Codifier! Reflections on Nietzsche
and Stendhal,” Cardozo Law Review 18, 85-96. 
Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1939), 108 F. 2d 95 (6th Circuit). 
White G. E., (1986), “Looking at Holmes in the Mirror,” Law and History Review 4, 439-466. 
WU J. C. H., (1960-1), “Justice Holmes and the Common-Law Tradition,” Vanderbilt Law Review 14,
221-238. 
NOTES
1. The  dichotomy  can  be  expressed  as  the  difference  between  a  static  and  dynamic  view.
Consider this passage, which is not strictly about the common law but about two interpretative
modes of legal analysis: “Static and dynamic modes have in common that the lawyer appeals to
history for authority; to the authority of an original text or tradition or founding moment, or to
the authority of the course of history itself, that is to the changing circumstances or long-run
evolutionary trends that dictate the need for a new rule or new interpretation. The past is read as
if it were a legal text with binding force, even if what is being cited is not exactly a text, but a
body of  intentions  or  a  collection of  practices.  The premise  is  that  if  we decipher the signs
correctly,  we can read out  of  them principles  and precedents  that  ought  to  control  current
interpretations. The past can control the present because it is continuously connected with the
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present through narratives of stasis or tradition, or of progress and decline.” (Gordon 1996: 125).
Gordon goes on the state:  “The critical  modes by contrast  are used to destroy,  or anyway to
question, the authority of the past. They assert discontinuous breaks between past and present.
In ordinary legal arguments perhaps the most familiar of these critical modes is the argument
from obsolescence or changed circumstances; the argument that the original reasons or purposes
of a rule have ceased to exist, or that the rule sprang from motives or a context that are no
longer  acceptable  to  modern  eyes,  are  rooted  in  ugly,  barbaric,  primitive  conceptions  or
practices.” (Gordon 1996: 125). Jeffrey G. Miller presents a similar dichotomy in “Evolutionary
Statutory Interpretation,” which “examines the seeming contrast between the legal doctrines
that the interpretation of statutes can evolve over time and that the interpretation of statutes
must be grounded only in their texts, which never change unless amended by Congress” (Miller
2009:  409).  Bernadette  Meyler  has  likewise  explained  that  “Originalists’  invocations  of  the
common law posit a fixed, stable, and unified eighteenth-century content, largely encapsulated
in William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England” (Meyler 2006: 553). On evolutionary
common  law  within  a  constitutional  context,  see  Jack  M.  Balkin’s  “The  Roots  of  the  Living
Constitution,” Balkin 2012.
2. Consider  these  examples  from  arbitrarily  selected  court  decisions  bearing  the  phrase  at
common law: “Jury trial at common law was not applicable to all common law actions, but was
grudgingly  conceded by the crown as  to  some and when our Constitution was adopted,  was
inapplicable to cases at common law where property was taken for public use” (Welch v.  TVA
1939: 98). “The coroner is not bound at common law to put down the effect of the evidence, in
writing, in any case” (U.S. v. Faw 1807: 1052). “To play at any game is no crime at common law,
even to  play  for  money;  therefore  there  can  be  no  offence  unless  it  be  attended with  such
circumstances as would themselves amount to a riot, or a nuisance, or to actual breach of the
peace without the playing” (U.S.  v.  Willis  1808: 699).  “In the case of libel in personam for the
recovery  of  damages  for  personal  injuries,  the  reason  for  following  the  limitations  of  the
common law in courts of admiralty is emphasized by reason of there being preserved to the
libelant in such a case the right to sue at common law, as well as in admiralty. In the event the
libelant  sued  at  common  law,  the  statute  of  limitations  would  bar  a  recovery.  It  would  be
inconsistent to permit him to sue in admiralty, with the same effect as at common law (as is true
in the case of a libel in personam), after his right to sue at common law had become barred.” (
McGrath v. Panama R. Co. 1924: 304). “In divining the generic, contemporary meaning, we look to a
number of  sources,  including federal  law, the Model Penal Code,  treatises,  and modern state
codes.  At  common  law,  it  was  not  necessary  to  allege  or  prove  an  act  in  furtherance  of  a
conspiracy” (U.S. v. Pascacio-Rodriguez 2014: 4). I acknowledge that the phrase at common law has a
long usage and that Sir Edward Coke himself employed it. 
3. “One of the most important contemporary constitutional debates is whether the meaning of
the  Constitution  may  evolve  in  light  of  current  circumstances,  or  whether  the  Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with how the text was originally understood by the public
that ratified it” (Schor 2010-1: 961). Gordon states: “The Constitution and the common law had a
core of ‘principle,’ of fundamental unchanging meanings. But principles had to be adapted to
changing circumstances, and above all, to the modernizing dynamic of historical evolution. The
static and dynamic modes were ultimately reconciled through eleology: the assertion that basic
legal principles were ‘working themselves pure,’ were gradually evolving from primitive, obscure
or cluttered forms to the highest and best realization of themselves. The ‘Classical’ liberals who
dominated  legal  thought  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century  needed  a  dynamic  view  of  history
because they knew perfectly well that the economic and political liberalism they espoused had
not existed in any pure form at  the Nation’s  founding.”  (Gordon 1996:  128).  Gordon believes
Originalists upend the traditional approach to constitutional interpretation in the United States:
“In their insistence that the ‘rule of law is a law of rules,’ the originalist-traditionalist jurists are,
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ironically, swimming against the main current of traditional American historical jurisprudence,
that  is  common-law  dynamic  adaptationism,  given  content  and  direction  by  liberal
modernization  theory”  (Gordon  1996:  132).  David  Strauss  agrees,  stating,  “[T]extualism  and
originalism remain inadequate models for understanding American constitutional law. They owe
their preeminence not to their plausibility but to the lack of a coherently formulated competitor.
The fear is that the alternative to some form of textualism or originalism is ‘anything goes’.”
(Strauss 1996: 879). 
4. According to Strauss,  “The common law method has not gained currency as a  theoretical
approach to constitutional interpretation because it is not an approach we usually associate with
a written constitution, or indeed with codified law of any kind. But our written constitution has,
by now, become part of an evolutionary common law system, and the common law – rather than
any model based on the interpretation of codified law – provides the best way to understand the
practices of American constitutional law.” (Strauss 1996: 885). He adds that “[c]onstitutional law
in the United States today represents a flowering of the common law tradition and an implicit
rejection of any command theory” (Strauss 1996: 887).
5. Theodore Plucknett states, “When English common law was being adopted in America there
was sometimes a question as to how far certain statutes were to be regarded as inseparable from
the customary common law” (Plucknett 2010: 309). “In Blackstone,” says William D. Bader, “early
American lawyers encountered a legal authority who regarded precedent as the cornerstone of
the common law, the principal  bulwark against the usurpation of the rule of  law by judicial
tyranny” (Bader  1994-5:  8).  See also  Van Ness  v.  Pacard.  (1829)  27  U.S.  (2  Pet)  137,  144:  “The
common law of England is not taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought
with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them
and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.”
6. David Konig states: “Identification of the role of the common law in providing a constitutional
foundation does not suggest an intent to adopt a federal common law. Rather, the ‘common-law
mind’ was a way of thinking, of using judicial authority to express abstract principles through
the application of particular privileges and rights,  such as trial  by jury.  It  rested on consent
created by long adherence to custom and precedent, and it was controlled by practice rather
than  abstraction.”  (Konig  2010:  510-1).  He  adds  that  “[c]ommon-law  constitutionalism  […]
provided both legitimacy and method. It meant a deference to the tacit consent that came only
from long adherence to precedent and the refinement and perfection of law by common-law
reasoning and decision making.” (Konig 2010: 511). 
7. “Holmes  considered  himself  a  Darwinist  and  concentrated  his  scholarly  energies  on  the
question of how law evolves. When Holmes was attending the meetings of the Metaphysical Club
during the early 1870s, Chauncey Wright, the group’s leader who Holmes treated as a mentor,
was in the midst of an extended, mutually supportive correspondence with Darwin.” (Blasi 2004:
25).
8. E.g., Palmer (1945: 569-73); Palmer (1946: 328-32); Palmer (1951: 809-11).
9. E.g., Howe (1951: 529-46); Hart (1951: 929-37); Howe (1950-1: 937-39).
10. E.g.,  Alschuler  (1997:  353-420);  Fisher  (2001:  455-92);  Brown  &  Kimball  (2001:  278-321);
Friedman (2001: 1383-1455); Bernstein (2003: 1-64); Strasser (2003: 1379-1408). 
11. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke states, “we can see the incipient pragmatism in Emerson’s
idealism” (Burke 1952: 277); moreover, he says, “Emerson’s brand of transcendentalism was but a
short step ahead of an out-and-out pragmatism” (Burke 1952: 277).
12. My earlier  work made this  very  mistake:  Mendenhall  (2011:  679-726);  Mendenhall  (2012:
517-50).  I  am,  however,  in good company:  see,  e.g.,  Weisberg  (1996:  85-96);  Pearcey  (2000-1:
483-511);  Matsuda  (1990:  1763-82);  Minow  and  Spelman  (1990:  1597-1652);  Radin  (1990:
1699-1726); and Schanck (1992: 2505-97). 
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13. “In recent decades philosophical pragmatism has been vulgarized and abused; and of late it
has sometimes found itself co-opted in support of this or that neo-analytic fashion. Something
not dissimilar has also happened in legal thinking: occasionally you read that legal pragmatism is
enjoying a ‘renaissance,’ but as you look closer you soon begin to wonder what, exactly, this is a
renaissance of; for the sad fact is that, in legal as in mainstream philosophy, vulgarization and co-
option seem to be the order of the day.” (Haack 2008: 455).
14. “He is one of the few jurists in American history whose career was long enough, and whose
impact  pervasive  enough,  to  have  functioned  as  a  kind  of  repository  of  changing  juristic
attitudes.  Holmes’s  role  as  a  repository  has  in  part  been a  function of  the seminality  of  his
thought and the memorable quality of his style, but it has also been a function of the deeply
ambivalent character of  his  jurisprudence and the cryptic nature of  his  expressions.” (White
1986: 440).
15. “It was in thinly settled colonial America that the Commentaries received most acclaim. By
1776 nearly twenty-five hundred copies were in use here, one thousand five hundred of which
were the American edition of 1772; a sale which Burke in 1775 in his speech on ‘Conciliation with
the American Colonies’ said rivaled that in England.” (Waterman 1932-3: 629-59). “It is part of the
accepted wisdom of American history that Sir William Blackstone and his Commentaries on the
Laws of England (Commentaries) have exercised a dominant and pervasive influence on America’s
political  thought  and  legal  development”  (Nolan  1976:  731-68).  “Before  the  Revolution  one
thousand English sets [of Blackstone’s Commentaries] at ten pounds a set were sold in American
and many more American editions sold at the bargain price of three pounds a set. In fact, before
the war broke out almost as many sets were sold in the American colonies as in England. The
work had an enormous effect in America not because of the ‘social consistency’ of Blackstone’s
thinking,  but because it  was the only general  treatise available in a land where well-trained
lawyers were almost non-existent.” (McKnight 1959: 401). Moreover, “during the period from
1789  to  1915,  the  authority  of  the  Commentaries  was  cited  ten  thousand  times  in  reported
American  cases”  (McKnight  1959:  401).  Americans’  reverence  toward  Blackstone  was  not
reciprocated: “While in Parliament from 1761 to 1770, he went along with all those restrictive
measures which first enraged and then estranged the American colonists. Actually, he was very
extreme in his anti-American bias, and he appeared among the most vociferous advocates of a
harsh  and  uncompromising  attitude  towards  America.  It  might  be  said  that  he  definitely
delighted in showing the colonists the rod.” (Chroust 1949: 28-9).
16. Coke stated (2003: 275), “And it appeareth in our Books, that in many Cases, the Common Law
doth controll Acts of Parliament, and somtimes shall adjudge them to be void: for when an Act of
Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed,
the Common Law will controll it, and adjudge such Act to be void.” Cf. Hale’s statement (1713:
45): “I come now to that other Branch of our Laws, the common Municipal law of this Kingdom,
which has the Superintendency of all those other particular Laws used in the before-mentioned
Courts, and is the common Rule for the Administration of common Justice in this great Kingdom;
of which it has been always tender, and there is great Reason for it; for it is not only a very just
and  excellent  Law  in  itself,  but  it  is  singularly  accommodated  to  the  Frame  of  the  English
Government, and to the Disposition of the English Nation, and such as by a long Experience and
Use is  at  it  were incorporated into their  very Temperament,  and,  in a  manner,  become this
Complexion and Constitution of the English Commonwealth.”
17. To say that Blackstone was categorically opposed to legislation is hyperbolic. The mistake is
understandable  given  Blackstone’s  celebration  of  the  common  law.  However,  Blackstone
notoriously declared that, “if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms […] that is vested to with authority to
control it” (Blackstone 1966: 91). Blackstone would seem to suggest here that a statute could be
valid even if it does not correspond with divine or natural law, a position that contradicts his
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willingness to overturn any prior cases that do not comport with reason or divine law: “For it is
established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation;
[…]  [y]et  this  rule  admits  of  exception,  where  the  former  determination  is  most  evidently
contrary to reason,  much more if  it  be contrary to the divine law” (Blackstone 1966:  69-70).
Michael Lobban explains that “Blackstone seems to have adopted [his] notion of parliamentary
without fully realizing its difficulties for his natural-law arguments and his belief in the primacy
of the common law” (Lobban 1987: 326).
18. Jeremy Bentham famously attacked Blackstone’s jurisprudence from a utilitarian, positivist
perspective; at sixteen, Bentham allegedly attended Blackstone’s lectures. John Austin would go
on to become Bentham’s positivist protégé. For more on this topic, see Mendenhall (2010: 319-34)
(discussing the  relationship  between the  natural  law theories  of  Jefferson and Blackstone in
contrast  to  the  utilitarian,  positivist  theories  of  Bentham  and  Austin).  For  critiques  of
Blackstone’s  jurisprudence  regarding  the  validation  of  British  law  and  state  power,  see  the
following: McKnight, who states, “The aim of English law, then, as Blackstone saw it, was to return
the Englishman to the ideal  primitive state long since departed from” (McKnight 1959:  404);
Chroust  (1949:  24-34)  (discussing  Blackstone’s  “abject  flattery  of  the  British  crown”  and  his
genuflections regarding the King’s  “absolute perfection” and accusing Blackstone of  creating
“pure fiction” and “calculating flattery” rather than scholarship).
19. “Blackstone’s  popularity  can  be  attributed  to  his  smooth  transformation  of  the  crabbed
particularities  of  the English law into the abstract  and universal  language demanded by the
intellectual fashions of the Enlightenment. His theoretical bow to the ultimate supremacy of the
natural  law  was  dictated  by  the  same  fashions  –  fashions  which,  in  England,  reflected  the
continuing prestige of the great figure of Locke.” (Grey 1978: 859-60).
20. “There is no question that Holmes was influenced by, and sought a relationship to, the work
of Sir Henry Maine. Scholars have yet to explore thoroughly the relationship between Maine and
Holmes. Holmes met Maine in the 1880s. As a law student, Holmes read Ancient Law more than
once. In 1875, Henry Adams described Holmes as ‘one of Maine’s warmest admirers.’ Scholars
have even claimed, unfortunately without adequate citation, that, in The Common Law, Holmes
wanted to do for common-law materials what Main had done for Roman law materials in Ancient
Law.” (Parker 2003: 68-9).
21. “[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; – and so of a legal right”
(Holmes  1897:  458).  Here  Holmes  calls  the  law a  “body  of  dogma or  systemized  prediction”
(Holmes 1897: 458).
22. “The law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth,
and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in
their moral sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. For instance, when
we speak of the rights of man in a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of interference with
individual  freedom  which  we  think  are  prescribed  by  conscience,  or  by  our  ideal,  however
reached. Yet it is certain that many laws have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that some
are enforced now, which are condemned by the most enlightened opinion of the time, or which
at  all  events  pass  the  limit  of  interference  as  many  consciences  would  draw  it.  Manifestly,
therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a
moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law. No doubt simple and
extreme cases can be put of imaginable laws which the statute making power would not dare to
enact, even in the absence of written constitutional prohibitions, because the community would
rise in rebellion and fight; and this gives some plausibility to the proposition that the law, if not a
part of morality, is limited by it. But this limit of power is not coextensive with any system of
morals. For the most part it falls far within the lines of any such system, and in some cases may
extend beyond them, for reasons drawn from the habits of a particular people at a particular
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time. I once heard the late Professor Agassiz say that a German population would rise if you
added two cents to the price of a glass of beer. A statute in such a case would be empty words, not
because it was wrong, but because it could not be enforced. No one will deny that wrong statutes
can be and are enforced, and we should not all agree as to which were the wrong ones.” (Holmes
1897: 460).
23. “[N]owadays no one doubts that a man may be liable, without any malevolent motive at all,
for  false  statements  manifestly  calculated  to  inflict  temporal  damage.  In  stating  the  case  in
pleading, we still should call the defendant’s conduct malicious; but, in my opinion at least, the
word means nothing about motives, or even about the defendant’s attitude toward the future,
but only signifies that the tendency of his conduct under the known circumstances was very
plainly to cause the plaintiff temporal harm.” (Holmes 1897: 463).
24. “[T]he North […] was anxious to leave transcendentalism behind. The generational shift from
transcendentalism to pragmatism is well known. […] A classic example is Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr., the son of Emerson’s good friend Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. The younger Holmes left for a
war he called ‘a crusade in the cause of the whole civilized world,’ but returned to announce, ‘I
do not know what is true.’ Higher law lost its allure among the young men who fought a bloody
war on its behalf.” (Levine & Malachuk 2011: 15-6).
ABSTRACTS
This essay builds on recent work by Susan Haack to suggest that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
conception of the common law was influenced by Darwinian evolution and classical pragmatism.
This is no small claim: perceptions of what the common law is and does within the constitutional
framework  of  the  United  States  continue  to  be  heavily  debated.  Holmes’s  paradigm  for  the
common  law  both  revised  and  extended  the  models  set  forth  by  Sir  Edward  Coke,  Thomas
Hobbes, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone. Adding additional substance to Haack’s
argument by pointing out passages in Holmes’s opinions and in his only book, The Common Law,
that corroborate her claims about the particular features of Holmes’s pragmatism, this essay
concludes by suggesting that, because of his connections with the classical pragmatists and his
reverence  for  Emerson,  Holmes is  the  best  place  to  begin  answering  the  famous  question
formulated by Stanley Cavell: “What’s the Use in Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”
AUTHOR
ALLEN MENDENHALL
Supreme Court of Alabama, Faulkner University, and Huntingdon College
allenporte[at]yahoo.com
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
21
